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National Intelligence Service: Special Report

National Intelligence Service (NIS)
Special Report Teil I und II

 

2013-07-01
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/593892.html

[Special reportage- NIS part I]

Intel gathering, political interference and surveillance

Recent election scandal leads to investigation into wide net of NIS agents’ political involvement
By Kim Nam-il, staff reporter

A parliamentary investigation into the National Intelligence Service’s (NIS) manipulation of public opinion during last December’s presidential election is set to begin soon. In the wake of this incident, calls for special measures to prevent political interference in the future are growing. Steps are being demanded to prevent the kind of widespread gathering of intelligence that is currently taking place not in the political and business worlds, but in with the media, academia, and civil society. This part of a special reportage series on the NIS looks at some of the problems with NIS’s intelligence-gathering tactics and offers some suggestions as to what kind of reforms might work.
 
It was the evening of June 24, and the politicians in Seoul’s Yeouido neighborhood were bowled over by the NIS’s surprising - and illegal - disclosure of transcripts from the 2007 inter-Korean summit between then-President Roh Moo-hyun and late North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. A drinking party was taking place at a nearby restaurant, with an NIS agent in charge of the National Assembly in attendance. Others at the dinner included lawmakers’ aides, securities company senior managers, political journalists, and polling organization heads. They went back and forth over Roh’s purported comments about the Northern Limit Line (NLL) and the NIS’s election tactics, before the conversation eventually drifted to claims from the securities company senior manager that a figure from Roh’s administration had manipulated stock prices. The prosecutors hadn’t thoroughly investigated the matter, the senior manager griped.
In the past, the NIS had what used to be called “coordinators.” These were agents who frequented government agencies, courts, and prosecutors’ offices to gather information on personnel appointments, policies, and improprieties. They also handled various complaints, and even coordinated and resolved conflicts over duties between organizations. After the Roh administration took office in 2003, the resident coordinator system at government agencies was ended - part of an effort to prevent political meddling by the NIS. But the agents continue to be found all over, newly christened by the organization as “intelligence officers” (IOs) or “liaison officers.” Believed to number in the hundreds, these agents frequent the National Assembly, government agencies, local governments, courts, prosecutors’ offices, news outlets, businesses, financial institutions, hotels, universities, and civic groups to collect various kinds of intelligence, which is prepared and presented every afternoon in a report to NIS headquarters. Some of the more sensitive details are analyzed and processed by the NIS, the reported directly to the President.

Also, some of the IOs and liaison officers go beyond the call of their intelligence collection duties. The NIS has been plagued by recent scandals about political interference and surveillance while working on sensitive political moves such as pressuring the network YTN to edit its broadcasts and investigating statements from university students about its election activities.
 
■ What kind of dirt is the NIS digging for? 
One to three IOs are typically assigned to a given organization, where they make contact with senior officials ranging from the heads of major bureaus to Cabinet ministers. They openly present themselves as “the NIS agent in charge here”, despite requirements for intelligence organization agents to conceal their identities. They hand over a name card bearing just their name and cell phone number, making it difficult to determine if they actually are NIS agents.
They pay visits to each of the offices or set dinner dates by phone. One of their most important jobs is learning about major issues and personnel appointments. They focus especially on gathering internal evaluations of senior officials. They don’t miss any of the finer points, including complaints about the appointments over drinks after work. At the Ministry of Health and Welfare, one of the IOs’ important jobs has reportedly been finding out how people feel about President Park Geun-hye’s execution of her election pledges, including her broken promise to expand the basic pension - a recent item of Blue House interest.

Some of the “small fry” ministries welcome the IOs, using them as a kind of “problem-solving window.” Said an senior official at one such ministry, “Whenever there’s a conflict between ministries over some business, we tell the IOs all about our issues. Depending on how they write their ‘reports,’ it might end up helping us.”

Local governments, where complaints about the central government are rife, also reportedly take advantage of the IOs. A senior official at one municipal government in the Honam region said, “We don’t have any links with the current administration, so we ask them to represent local opinion.”

Senior government officials and public enterprise employees are very sensitive to the personnel records the IOs draft. The reason, they say, is that they don’t know if any bristling at the requests made of them might result in poor evaluations being reported to the Blue House. Allegations recently surfaced that former NIS chief Won Sei-hoon pressured a public enterprise head to give a project to a certain construction company, and some said the personnel records - which have a major impact on public enterprise personnel appointments - may have served as leverage.

“If you give a bad impression to the IOs, your personal information could be reported to bad places that affect your chances for promotion or contract extension,” said an intelligence organization source on condition of anonymity.

The IOs are also known to sometimes use their personnel intelligence as bait for “intelligence exchanges.”

IOs from the NIS are also frequent visitors at the prosecutors’ office. Sources say that from time to time they call on the chief prosecutor, the second in command, and department heads to ask them for information about investigations that are underway.
 
“While we cannot give them details for security reasons, we do provide the appropriate level of information,” a source at the prosecution said on condition of anonymity. “This is because we are always mindful of the annual personnel records that these IOs prepare.”

The NIS has a separate economics team, which is put in charge of chaebol and economic organizations. These kinds of agents are typically referred to by such titles as “managing director” or “vice president.” They typically meet with company executives, but in the majority of cases the executives don’t know who else they may be seeing, even inside the same company. The agents get the scoop on economic issues, unreleased company figures, and investment plans.


■ Are there legal grounds? 
It is obligatory for IOs to draft at least one report each day. They have to start writing their reports around 4pm and submit them to their senior when they are finished. These reports are filtered and processed as they pass through the NIS information bureau and strategic office. “The agents at the bottom only submit fragmentary information, but people at higher levels are putting together hundreds of reports coming in from all over the country like a jigsaw puzzle,” said an official had worked as an IO for the NIS on condition of anonymity. “That’s how they get to the big picture.” Special recognition is given to the IOs who report the intelligence that makes it all the way to the desk of the NIS director.

But there is no legal basis for such activity by NIS IOs. The National Intelligence Service Act (NIS Act)limits the scope of the NIS’s domestic intelligence collection to countering communism, activity intended to overthrow the government, counter-espionage, counter terrorism, and international criminal syndicates. For the NIS to use its IOs to sweep up background chatter that has no direct connection with national security is in clear violation of the NIS Act and outside of its authority.

The NIS counters these charges by claiming that the basis for these activities can be found in Article 3, Clause 1, Section 5 of the act, which mentions “planning and coordination of information and public security service.” The specific scope of the “coordination” in this act was not defined through legislation but rather through a presidential order. The enforcement order for the act calls for collection and collation of security intelligence for government ministries. This too is limited to security intelligence, but the NIS uses a broad interpretation of this to justify meticulously going through the actions of organization heads, personnel complaints, and government policies.

How could gossip swapped over drinks after work or rumors about senior officials be useful for running a government? “Sometimes I wonder how the intelligence that is collected in this way, which is sometimes on the level of the tabloids, is helpful for governing the country,” said a senior figure who worked with intelligence for an auditing organization. The NIS argues that it not only collects information on trends but that it also produces “policy intelligence” that assesses government policies. However, examining government policy is something that is supposed to be done by the government policy coordination office, a subordinate body of the Prime Minister’s office.

Aside from the fact that there is no legal basis for it, the work of these IOs is always liable to being used for political purposes. Or in other words, reports on political figures can be tools for political maneuvering, and reports on the press can be employed to manipulate the press.
Recently, allegations were made that an NIS IO working at YTN (Yonhap Television News) requested an editor in the newsroom to prevent a special report about the NIS manipulation of public opinion during the presidential election from being aired and that the IO’s request was acted on.

During the Roh administration (2003-2008), the NIS compiled a list of political and government officials said to have received bribes based on information it collected about criminal activities in the JU Group pyramid scheme - and then leaked this to the press.

In the trial related to this, the extent to which the NIS should be allowed to collect information inside South Korea became the point of contention. “Even in a case in which there may be many victims throughout the country, the task of collecting information and investigating the case falls upon the investigating authorities; it is not within the authority of the NIS,” the court ruled. The implication is that information about crimes is something for the investigators to gather, and it is not the business of the NIS to get involved in this.

A former agent who had worked as an IO for the NIS summed up the work he had done like this, on condition of anonymity: “Doesn’t my job sound a little strange? Nothing about it is clearly defined…”


 

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/594058.html
2013-07-02

[Special reportage- NIS part II]

The NIS as the director personal fiefdom

Former director bred a culture where loyalty and subservience are rewarded over good work

By Jung Hwan-bong, staff reporter

National Intelligence Service (NIS) agents referred to former director Won Sei-hoon as “the man who came from the sky.” The moniker had been coined to poke fun at the fact that Won was a close confidante of former President Lee Myung-bak and became director through a so-called “parachute” appointment in Feb. 2009, immediately after the Lee administration had been shaken by the candlelight vigils protesting the import of US beef. But the term stuck as a symbol of a man who turned the intelligence agency into his own personal fiefdom. For four years and one month, he effectively pushed NIS employees to meddle in politics in order to suppress the left and wielded his authority over personnel management like a bulldozer, judging people according to how loyal they were to the administration.

Former NIS Director Won Sei-hoon (right) and Kwon Young-se, then an NIS agent and current ambassador to China, walk to a meeting of the National Assembly Intelligence Committee, June 22, 2011. (by Park Jong-shik, staff photographer)

■ Won’s politics of fear 
From the beginning of his tenure as director, the confidant of Lee Myung-bak used “politics of fear” to turn the NIS into an organization that was loyal to him. In May 2009, a level-two manager in the office of investigation at the NIS, surnamed Yun, was reprimanded. This was triggered by a single comment that he had made over lunch with an agent from the office of inspection. “In some ways, the government went too far in the Apr. 3 suppression on Jeju Island,” Yun had said. The office of inspection interpreted the remark as “leftist,” and Won put Yun on the list of agents to be reassigned. Yun was no rookie, either, having a great deal of seniority in the office of investigation.

“There wasn’t anyone else who had Yun’s expertise on investigations into spy rings. He was an old hand in the office of investigation, and he was reprimanded for a ridiculous reason,” NIS agents said. “After this, there was a lot of talk at the NIS about how it wasn‘t even safe to eat lunch with the other employees.” Yun was placed on the waiting list for reassignment, and he ultimately left the NIS. In short, a high-ranking NIS official who had investigated numerous spy rings had been driven out of the organization for being too leftist.

Similar things happened again and again. In Sep. 2009, a level-four team leader in the office of investigation, surnamed Kang, was reviewing a report by one of his subordinates when he was troubled by the phrase, “the past ten years of leftist administrations.” He thought that labeling these administrations as “leftist” was going a bit far, considering that they had not taken power illegally. Kang instructed his subordinate to change the phrase to “the past ten years of administrations.” But an agent who had overhead the conversation reported his remarks to the office of inspection, and Kang was demoted, shunted off to a provincial office.

On Sep. 29, 2011, a level-five NIS agent by the name of Kim was let go for making disparaging remarks about Won while having some drinks. Kim made the remarks during a meal with about ten employees at the NIS in Nov. 2010. After having a little to drink, Kim had said, “Won was a stooge of Lee Myung-bak back when Lee was the mayor of Seoul. What could he know about running this place?” This was the time when rumors floating around the NIS about Won being involved in all kinds of irregularities. The NIS took issue with Kim’s remarks, saying he had insulted a superior. A disciplinary board review meeting was held, which decided that Kim would be fired.

But if Won was overzealous in punishing transgressors, he also took particular care of his loyal subordinates. On Dec. 18, 2012 one day before the presidential election Won carried out a personnel reshuffle. This was the first time the NIS had reassigned staff on the day before the presidential election. “There are a lot of political agents who are trying to gain influence with politicians, so I decided to just do the reshuffle myself,” Won said. The majority of people who were promoted on Dec. 18 were members of Won’s inner circle, including an information officer surnamed Lee who had been in charge of Seoul when Won was assistant mayor of Seoul.
 
■ Demanding submission while changing laws and systems 
What Won desired from NIS employees was not professionalism but subservience, as is effectively illustrated by the clemency review commissions. Won set up the clemency review commissions, promising to rehabilitate some employees who had been subjected to disciplinary action if they could receive the endorsement of their division chief. The implication was that agents who confessed their wrongdoing would be shown mercy. The majority of agents were not pleased by such measures.

The newsletter of the office of inspection, which was circulated among all the NIS agents and carried tales of disciplinary action, started being printed more frequently. While the bulletin had formerly been published quarterly, after Won assumed the role of director, it started coming out once a month. “They were pretty clearly telling us to get on our knees and beg,” said an NIS agent on condition of anonymity.

Won also changed laws to make it easier to take disciplinary action against agents. On May 29, 2009, a mid-level manager in the NIS surnamed Lee was summoned before the disciplinary board and was demoted. A woman that Lee had known had filed a complaint with the NIS that he had tricked her into a sexual relationship by making an empty promise to marry her. The NIS also charged him with leaking classified information because he had told the woman about the location of the Chongryon headquarters in Tokyo when he was studying in Japan, even though that information was already available online.

But Won, believing that demotion was too lenient a punishment, ordered the disciplinary board to convene once more. When the second disciplinary board concluded about ten days later, Lee was dismissed.

On April 13, 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that Lee had been unfairly dismissed. The court argued that there were no legal grounds for the NIS to hold a second disciplinary hearing just because it felt the decision of the first disciplinary hearing had been too lenient.
Next, on Sep. 21, the NIS added Clause 41.2 to the enforcement order of the National Intelligence Service Employee Act, creating a legal basis for holding a second disciplinary board. Unable to break the law, the NIS just made a new one.
 
■ Arbitrary personnel decisions and compulsory loyalty have ruined the intelligence organization

Won’s unilateral demands for loyalty and his preposterous abuse of his personnel management authority have weakened the NIS’s capacity to gather intelligence, which is the chief asset of any intelligence organization. The best example is the collapse of the overseas intelligence network. After Won was appointed director in 2009, he recalled about 50 employees who had been assigned to the overseas division. The reshuffle even included agents who had been overseas for less than three months.

Won filled the empty spots with members of his own coterie. Having experience serving in the overseas division, it turns out, works in one’s favor in getting promoted inside the NIS. “Agents who are assigned overseas invest a lot of time in developing their sources, but these sources disappear when the agent who was in charge of them is rotated out,” an NIS agent said on condition of anonymity. “Won’s ignorance of this and other basic aspects of intelligence work led him to focus only on the promotion of his followers and to lose a lot of our assets.”

The disintegration of the overseas intelligence network has also affected information gathering about North Korea, since a substantial amount of the intelligence that the NIS gathers on North Korea comes in from overseas. The fact that the NIS was caught unaware by developments in the North, including the death of former leader Kim Jong-il and the launch of the long-range missile, during Won’s tenure at the helm appears related to his flagrant abuse of his authority over personnel.

To be sure, even before Lee Myung-bak became president, directors of the NIS demanded blind allegiance to the administration in power and gave promotions to those who are close to themselves or influential political heavyweights and have the right connections, school background, and political affiliation. NIS agents have seen their fortunes reverse each time the party in power changes. “During the Kim Dae-jung administration, a great number of people from Jeolla province were appointed, and they walked around with their noses in the air for quite some time,” said one NIS agent. “But after Lee Myung-bak took power and for some time since then, people from Daegu and North Gyeongsang Province have been dominating the NIS.”
With this “learned effect” exacerbated by Won’s domineering approach to personnel management, many NIS agents are said to be leery about attending hometown reunions or joining alumni organizations. Who you know and how loyal you are to the boss have become more central to survival than how well you do your job.

“There are a lot of NIS agents who are driven by a sense of mission, and there are a plenty of talented and professional agents who hunker down and focus on their work. But I don’t know when they will be rewarded for what they do,” said one NIS agent with a sigh.

Mit freundlicher Erlaubnis von The Hankyoreh

 

 

 

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