2015: "To the Courts! To the Streets! Okinawa"
Okinawa. Henoko. Camp Schwab.
Quelle: The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 13, Issue. 47, No. 4, December 7, 2015
Mit freundlicher Erlaubnis von Japan Focus
To the Courts! To the Streets! Okinawa at December 2015
As this Asia-Pacific Journal site (and its associated publications) has repeatedly demonstrated, Okinawa is a unique joint US-Japanese colony, that has endured 70 years of lying, deception, manipulation, discrimination, abuse and contempt from the Tokyo-based nation state. But it has also generated an opposition movement of world-historical significance on the part of the Okinawan people. That movement remains little understood internationally. The accompanying “position paper” by the “All Okinawa Council”1 is one recent initiative to try to remedy the situation.
What follows here is a resume of recent developments in the “Okinawa problem,” through the prism of the contradiction between the nation state headed by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and the prefecture headed by the Governor, Onaga Takeshi, followed by a consideration of the three major dimensions of the ongoing struggle between them: in the realms of information, the law, and the physical confrontation at the Henoko site. The multi-faceted struggle enters a phase
2015: Ecumenical Forum in Pyongyang
Source: Asia Pacific Ecumenical News APEN, October 28, 2015
Ecumenical visit heightens hopes for better relations between the two Koreas
Twelve Korean and international church leaders arrived in Pyongyang on 23 October for a meeting of the executive committee of the Ecumenical Forum for Peace, Reunification and Development Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula.
The National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK) and the Korean Christian Federation (KCF), the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the Christian Conference of Asia (CCA) are behind this initiative.
At the 10th WCC Assembly, held in Busan in 2013, the world churches resolved
2015: Urgent Okinawan Appeal for Help
Okinawa. Henoko. Camp Schwab.
The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 13, Issue. 41, October 19, 2015
Please, see also former appeals from Okinawa/Henoko
Read this article as pdf.
In-depth critical analysis of the forces shaping the Asia-Pacific...and the world.
Urgent Okinawan Appeal for Help
Oct. 17, 2015
[Henoko] Council against the Helicopter Base
Introduced by Gavan McCormack and translated by Doug Lummis
To Japan and to the world Japan is a democratic country, in which popular sovereignty, the rule of law, and the division of powers (executive, legislative, judicial) are assured. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo has repeatedly told international fora – including the US Congress and the UN General Assembly – that such is the case. But what is evolving now in the course of confrontation between the Abe government and the people of Okinawa, led by their Governor, suggests otherwise.
Okinawa’s travail, in its present, intense form, owes to the determination of the Abe government to overrule the overwhelming Okinawan consensus it confronted on taking office (for the second time) in December 2012 that no new base should be constructed in the prefecture. Such a view first surfaced in 1996, as soon as the Henoko plan was announced. Under the government design, a major military facility would be constructed on Oura Bay (Henoko district) for the US Marine Corps, to which the existing, obsolescent and inconvenient Futenma Marine Base, currently set in the middle of Ginowan City, could be transferred. By 2012 the Okinawan consensus of opposition to that design was overwhelming, shared even by the Okinawan members of Abe’s ruling LDP, the Governor, and the heads of almost all Okinawan towns and cities. Never in Japan’s modern history had any prefecture so unanimously opposed the central government on a matter of such moment.
Fukushima - 4 Jahre danach: 11.03.2015
The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 13, Issue. 41, No. 1, October 19, 2015
Inside Fukushima's Potemkin Village: Naraha
David McNeill, Androniki Christodoulou
Twice a year, journalists are taken on guided tours of the ruined Daiichi nuclear plant, operated by Tokyo Electric Power Co (TEPCO). The drive there from the southern outskirts of the 20-kilometer exclusion zone imposed in 2011 took them through the nearly empty towns of Hirono, Naraha, Tomioka, Okuma and Futaba. The state of neglect could be measured by the encroachment of weeds and wild animals, and the slow decrepitude of housing and infrastructure.
Despite the decline and the still urgent beeping of Geiger counters nearer the plant, there has never been any official talk of abandoning the area. Instead, it was divided up into three zones with awkward euphemisms to suggest just the opposite: communities with radiation of 20 millisieverts (mSv) or less (the typical worldwide limit for workers in nuclear plants) are “being prepared for lifting of evacuation order;” 20-50 mSv are “no-residence zones;” the most heavily contaminated (50mSv) are “difficult-to-return.”
A vast public-works project was started three years ago to decontaminate an area roughly half the size of Rhode Island, at an estimated cost of $50 billion. Compensation by TEPCO was explicitly linked to the possibility that many of the 160,000 nuclear refugees would return,
2015: Supreme Court Rules on Hibakusha
2015 - 70 Jahre nach den Atombomben auf Hiroshima und Nagasaki
und 4 Jahre nach Fukushima
Quelle: 09.09.2015, http://wp.me/pp3Fm-1hp
Japans oberstes Gericht spricht koreanischen Atombombenopfern Hilfeleistungen zu
by Reinhard Zöllner
70 Jahre nach dem Abwurf der Atombomben auf Hiroshima und Nagasaki haben nun auch deren nicht-japanischen Opfer das Recht erstritten, ihre dabei erlittenen Leiden in Japan kostenlos medizinisch behandeln zu lassen. Dieses Recht steht gesetzlich allen Atombombenopfern (hibakusha 被爆者) zu -- gleich, wo sie leben und welche Staatsangehörigkeit sie besitzen, stellte am 8.9.2015 Japans Oberster Gerichtshof fest. Bislang hatten Japans Regierung und die zuständigen Präfekturen den betroffenen Ausländern -- von denen die meisten Koreaner sind -- diese Leistungen versagt. In vielen Fällen wurden bisher lediglich bis zu 300.000 Yen im Jahr (ca. 2.250 Euro) als Ersatzleistung gezahlt,
Hundreds of Legal Experts Unite
The State Secrets Protection Bill (2013)
The Asahi Shimbun, August 27, 2015
Hundreds of legal experts unite to attack Abe’s ‘unconstitutional’ security bills
by RYOTA GOTO/ Staff Writer
Three hundred or so legal experts gathered for a huge protest meeting to call on the Abe administration to withdraw security legislation that they say is unconstitutional. Former Supreme Court justices, previous director-generals of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau and other constitutional scholars and legal experts held the meeting Aug. 26 to protest the government’s efforts
2015: "Abe Doctrine"
Security in Northeast Asia - JAPAN & KOREA & CHINA
An ‘Abe Doctrine’ as Japan’s Grand Strategy: New Dynamism or Dead-End?
Jul. 21, 2015
Christopher W. Hughes
Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s stunning return to power in the December 2012 landslide election victory, and the consolidation of his leadership in a repeat victory in December 2014, has heralded the resurgence for Japan of a more assertive, high-profile, and high-risk, foreign and security policy.[i] However, as Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy Under the ‘Abe Doctrine’ suggests, Abe’s status as an arch-‘revisionist’ ideologue, combined with the track record of his first administration in 2006-2007, made clear that he would move aggressively to shift Japan towards a more radical external agenda—characterized by a defense posture less fettered by past anti-militaristic constraints, a more fully integrated US-Japan alliance, and an emphasis on ‘value-oriented’ diplomacy with East Asian states and beyond.[ii] Indeed, Abe’s diplomatic agenda has been so distinctive and forcefully articulated in past years that it might be labeled as a doctrine capable of rivaling, and even of displacing, the doctrine of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru that has famously charted Japan’s entire post-war international trajectory. In contrast to Abe’s more muscular international agenda, the so-called ‘Yoshida Doctrine’, forged in the aftermath of total defeat in the Pacific War, has long emphasized for Japan the need for a pragmatic and low-profile foreign policy, a highly constrained defense posture, reliance but not over-dependence on the US-Japan security treaty, and the expedient rebuilding of economic and diplomatic ties with East Asian neighbors.[iii]